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188 F.3d 521 (D.C. Circuit 1999)
Issue: Whether the FCC failed to give a rational
explanation of its selection of six percent as the
historical component of productivity offset, or "Xfactor," to be used in adjusting price caps by
which the FCC regulates access charges paid to local exchange carriers (LECs) by interexchange
carriers (IXCs) for transmission of long-distance
telephone calls.
Holding Remand was required to permit the
FCC to explain its decision, in modifying the
methodology used to limit access charges paid to
LECs by IXCs for transmission of long-distance
telephone calls.
Discussion: The court held that the FCC failed
to give a rational explanation of its selection of
6.0% as the historical component of productivity
offset ("X-factor") to be used in adjusting price
caps by which the FCC regulated charges. The
court questioned the FCC's methodology, stating
that its decision to devalue the lowest averages as
improbable was not justified. The court further
held that the FCC's reliance on what it perceived
as an upward trend reflected an unexplained assumption that the trend would continue in the
immediate future, where reasons exist to doubt
the continuation of that trend. Finally the court
found that the FCC's use of only one carrier's Xfactor estimates appeared in light of the FCC's rejection of that carrier's analysis.
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v. FCC 180 F.3d 307 (U.S. App. D.C.
1999)
Issue: Local exchange carriers sought review of
FCC order denying LEC's motion for reconsideration of investigation order finding certain rates
charged to interexchange carriers unjust and unreasonable.
Holding The court held that a petition seeking
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review of an order denying reconsideration is cannot be reviewed absent new evidence or changed
circumstances. The court refused to read the petition as a petition for review of the investigation
order itself, since intent to seek review of the investigation order could not fairly be inferred from
the petition for review or from subsequent filings.
Discussion: According to the court, evidence relating to the growth in minutes of use per common line, in connection with the calculation of
rates to be charged to interexchange carriers, was
not new evidence that would warrant judicial review of an FCC order denying reconsideration of
a prior investigation order finding certain rates
unjust and unreasonable. The court reasoned that
the evidence was not new in the sense of being
discovered after the FCC issued its investigation
order. The court stated that the purported evidence was not evidence at all but simply argument
that the FCC made a material error.
U.S. WEST INC., V. FCC 182 F.3d 1224 (10th
Cir. 1999)
Issue: Whether the FCC regulations that required telecommunications companies, in most
instances, to obtain affirmative approval from the
customer before the company could use that customer's "customer proprietary network information" for marketing purposes constitutes a restriction on speech within the meaning of the First
Amendment's free speech clause.
Holding: The Court of Appeals held that "customer proprietary network information" (CPNI)
is "commercial speech" for purposes of the First
Amendment's free speech clause. The court further held that the FCC failed to show that its regulations directly and materially advanced the FCC's
asserted interests in privacy and increased competition, and finally, these regulations were not narrowly tailored to further those asserted interests.
Discussion:In the context of a speech restriction
imposed to protect privacy by keeping certain in-
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formation confidential, the government must
show that the dissemination of the information
desired to be kept private would inflict specific
and significant harm on individuals. Examples of
such harm include undue embarrassment or ridicule, intimidation or harassment, or misappropriation of sensitive personal information for the
purposes of assuming another's identity.
The FCC failed to show that its regulations directly and materially advanced the FCC's asserted
interests in privacy and increased competition.
There was no evidence regarding how and to
whom carriers would disclose CPNI to outside
parties, and no analysis of how allowing existing
carriers to market new services with CPNI would
impede competition for those services. Further,
the FCC failed to adequately consider a less restrictive "opt-out" approach, in which approval
would be inferred from the customer-carrier relationship unless the customer specifically requested that his or her CPNI be restricted. The
availability of less burdensome alternatives to accomplish the FCC's stated purpose for restricting
commercial speech signals that the fit between
the legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish these ends may be too imprecise to withstand First Amendment scrutiny.
U.S.

WEST V.

FCC 177 F.3d 1057 (D.C. Cir.

1999)
Issue: Whether the FCC reasonably interpreted
§271 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
which generally bars Bell operating companies
(BOCs) from providing long-distance service
originating in a region in which it provided local
service, to ban agreements under which BOCs
were to market provider's services to their customers.
Holding: The court denied the Bell operating
companies' petition for review of the FCC order
banning agreements under which the BOCs were
to market provider's services to their customers,
and held that the FCC had reasonably interpreted
§271 of the Act.
Discussion: In May 1998 two of the BOCs, US
West and Ameritech, announced deals with Quest
Communications Corporation under which each
BOC would market Quest's long distance to its
customers. Each BOC employed a special label for
the resulting package, each offered the customer
"one-stop shopping" for both local and long dis-
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tance, with all customer support (sign-up and
servicing) through the BOCs own toll-free
number. Quest was to compensate each BOC with
a fixed fee for every customer obtained. The order at issue was handed down by the Commission
as a result of adjudicative proceedings which followed administrative complaints filed by competitors of Quest in the long-distance market.
In its decision to deny the BOCs petition, the
court considered the FCC's finding that marketing arrangements would give BOCs greatly advantageous positions in the market for local and long
distance service once they became explicitly entitled to provide long distance service, concluding
that the FCC reasonably interpreted § 271. The
court found that marketing qualified as a provision of service forbidden by this provision. Otherwise, by offering one-stop shopping for local and
long distance under their own brand name and
with their own customer care, BOCs could build
up goodwill as full-service providers, positioning
themselves in these markets before § 271 actually
allows them to enter.
RADIO TELEVISION NEWS DIRECTORS ASSOCIATION AND NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
BROADCASTERS V. FCC 184 F.3d 872 (D.C. Cir.

1999)
Issue: Whether an order in which the FCC announced that it would not enforce the fairness
doctrine, which required broadcast licensees to
provide reasonable opportunity for presentation
of contrasting viewpoints, operates to directly rescind the personal attack and the political editorial rules.
Holding: The court remanded the case for the
FCC to further explain its decision not to repeal
or modify the personal attack rule or the political
editorial rule. The court held that the order at issue, abrogating the fairness doctrine, did not directly rescind or compel the demise of the personal attack rule or the political editorial rule.
The court further stated that the FCC bears the
burden of explanation on review of its decision
not to repeal these rules.
Discussion:After the FCC deadlocked on its proposal to repeal the personal attack and political
editorial rules, broadcasting organizations petitioned for review of the FCC decision not to repeal these rules. The personal attack rule requires
broadcasters to give notice and response opportu-
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nity to those attacked during the presentation of
views on controversial public issues, and the political editorial rule affords political candidates notice of and opportunity to respond to editorials
opposing them or endorsing another candidate.
After issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking
("NPRM") proposing to reveal or modify the two
challenged rules, having concluded that the rules
might no longer be in the public interest, the FCC
ultimately issued a joint statement of commissioners who, in a deadlocked vote, supported retention of the two rules. The court remanded, stating
that the FCC did not adequately explain why the
public would benefit from the rules, which raised
significant policy and constitutional doubts due to
their interference with the editorial judgments of
journalists and the entanglement of the government in the media's day to day operations. The
court also expressed concerns that in its statement, the FCC did not dispel concerns previously
raised by the FCC itself.

UNITED STATES V. POPA 187 F.3d 672 (D.C.
Cir. 1999)
Issue: Whether a criminal statute prohibiting
the making of anonymous phone calls made with
the intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass, violated the First Amendment, when applied to a
defendant for making calls to a United States Attorney containing racial epithets and complaining
about alleged assaults by police offers.
Holding: The court reversed the defendant's
conviction on First Amendment grounds. According to the court, the criminal statute, as applied to
the defendant's conduct, violates the First
Amendment in inasmuch as the statute could
have been drawn more narrowly, without a loss of
utility to the government, by excluding from its
scope those who intended to engage in public or
political discourse.
Discussion:The defendant Popa is a political refugee from Romania who has resided in the U.S.
since 1986. Popa was convicted in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia
under 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C) which is punishable by a fine and up to two years imprisonment.
The district court applied intermediate scrutiny,
holding that the statute was constitutional on its
face because it "regulates potentially expressive
conduct to serve the compelling interest of pro-

tecting people from often frightening and annoying telephone harassment".
On appeal, the government claimed that since
Popa neither argued to the district court nor testified at trial that his speech was political in nature,
the court should review the case only for plain error. The Court of Appeals reviewed the claim de
novo, finding that Popa had properly preserved
the issue for appeal, and finding that the statute,
as applied to Popa does not survive intermediate
scrutiny. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found
that the punishment of those who use the telephone to communicate a political message is obviously not essential to the furtherance of the government's interest in protecting innocent
individuals from non-communicative uses of the
telephone.

191 F.3d 463
Issue: Whether the section of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act which forbids disclosure of illegally intercepted communication, and
the corresponding Florida statute, violate the First
Amendment, as applied to a Congressman who
delivered to newspapers a tape recording of cellular telephone conversations intercepted illegally,
when the conversation related to matters of public concern.
Holding: The Court of Appeals found that these
statutes do not violate the First Amendment in
this context because the statutes forbid the publication of information obtained at an earlier time
in an illicit fashion.
Discussion: John A. Boehner, a Republican
member of the House of Representatives, representing the Eighth District of Ohio brought this
action against James A. McDermott, a Democratic
member of the House representing the Seventh
District of Washington. On December 21, 1996,
Boehner participated in a conference call with
members of the Republican Party leadership, discussing strategy regarding an expected Ethics
Subcommittee announcement of then-Speaker of
the House Newt Gingrich's agreement to accept a
reprimand and to pay a fine in exchange for the
committee's promise not to hold a hearing. The
conversation was scanned and recorded by two
Florida residents, who delivered the tape to Rep.
McDermott, then the ranking Democratic member of the House Ethics Committee. McDermott
BOEHNER V. MCDERMOTT
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gave copies of the tapes to the New York Times,
the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, and Roll Call.
The tapes, revealing Gingrich engaged in conduct
that may have violated the agreement, had great
value for the three newspapers.
The Petitioner invokes the civil liability provisions of the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act, claiming that McDermott had illegally disclosed the contents of the conference call, knowing it to have been illegally intercepted, and seeking statutory damages of $10,000. The Court of
Appeals considered McDermott's First Amendment defense, and applied the O'Brien analysis
for statutes containing generally applicable, content neutral prohibitions on conduct that create
incidental burdens on speech. According to the
court, the statutory scheme served a substantial
governmental interest in preserving personal privacy, and promoted rather than infringed freedom of speech. Furthermore, any incidental restriction on speech imposed by the statutes are no
greater than what is essential to furthering that
governmental interest.
SOUTHWESTERN
PANY
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v. FCC (8th Cir. Dec. 27, 1999)

Issue: Whether or not "shared transport" is a
"network element" as defined in section 153(29)
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, and if so,
whether or not it must be provided on an "unbundled basis," pursuant to section 251 (C) (3) of the
Act.
Holding: The court held that the FCC's was correct in its decision in its Third Order on Reconsideration, In re Implementation of the Local
Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Third Order on Reconsideration
and Futher Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 12 FCC

Rcd. 12460 (1997), declaring "shared transport"
to be a "network element." However, the court vacated that portion of the Third Order on Reconsideration which requires that "shared transport"
be made available on an "unbundled basis" pursuant to section 251 (c) (3), and remanded for further consideration by the FCC.
Discussion:These cases came to the court on remand from the Supreme Court following vacation
of the 8 th Circuit's original judgment (reported at
153 F.3d 597). The cases were remanded to the 8 th
Circuit for further reconsideration in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa
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Utilities Board, 119 S.Ct. 721 (1999). The 8th Circuit reissued its previous opinion, reported at 153
F.3f 597, except for part II B thereof.

RT
-

COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

v. FCC

__

F.3d

(Jan. 13, 2000 10th Cir.)

Issue: Whether the FCC's Orders preempting
reasonably interpreted § 253 (b) of the Telecommunications Act when it preempted a Wyoming
telecommunications statute finding that the statute was not "competitively neutral".
Holding: The FCC reasonably interpreted § 253
(b), finding that the Wyoming statute could not
be saved under this provision because it was not
competitively neutral.
Discussion: In order to induce the development
of telecommunications infrastructure in rural areas, the Wyoming Telecommunications Act of
1995 provided small incumbent telephone companies with a ten year period of protection from
competition until had substantially recovered its
investment for upgraded services in that particular area. The court agreed with the FCC's finding
that the statute was not competitively neutral, because it awards certain incumbent LECs the ultimate competitive advantage- preservation of monopoly status, and simultaneously saddles
potential new entrants with the ultimate competitive disadvantage- an insurmountable barrier to
entry.
The court looked to Cablevision of Boston, Inc., v.
Public Improvement Commission, 184 F.3d 88 (1st
Cir. 1999), which states that § 253 (c) imposes at
most a negative restriction on local authorities'
choices regarding the management of their rights
of way. Accordingly, the statute would not require
local authorities to purposefully seek out opportunities to level the telecommunications playing
field. If, however, a local authority decides to regulate for its own reasons, § 253 ( c) requires that
it do so in a way that avoids creating unnecessary
competitive inequities among telecommunications providers.

IN RE NEXTWAVE PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS,

INC.;

FCC

COMMUNICATIONS,

v.

NEXTWAVE

INC.

PERSONAL

200 F.3d 43 (2d Cir.

1999)
Issue: Whether the district and bankruptcy
courts exceeded their jurisdiction by in effect in-
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tervening in the allocation of radio spectrum
licenses and misconstrued the nature of the Appellee's financial obligations under the FCC's
spectrum auction rules.
Holding:The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the district court. The court held that the
bankruptcy and district courts had no power to interfere with the FCC's system for allocating spectrum licenses and that, in any event, the courts
erred in determining that NextWave's payment
obligation was constructively fraudulent. The
court reversed the judgment of the district court
affirming the five orders of the bankruptcy court
and remanded for further proceeding.
Discussion: The decisions and orders of the
bankruptcy court, affirmed by the district court in
judgment from which the FCC appeals, held that
the FCC's grant to NextWave Personal Communi-

cations, Inc. of sixty-three radio spectrum licenses
for which NextWave had been the high bidder at
the FCC's 1995-96 "C-block" auction was a constructively fraudulent conveyance for purposes of
11 U.S.C. § 544. The bankruptcy court, therefore
avoided $3.7 billion of NextWave's $4.74 billion
obligation to the FCC, allowing NextWave to keep
its Licenses while it reorganized in bankruptcy.
The Second Circuit held that the bankruptcy
court had no such authority to interfere with the
FCC's system for allocating spectrum licenses.
The court also found that the bankruptcy court
wrongly concluded that the Licenses were fraudulently conveyed by failing to defer to the FCC's
interpretation of its own regulations when determining the point at which NextWave's obligations
were incurred for § 544 purposes.

